A fact that surprises even people who work in immigration policy is that Congress never created Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
The agency traces its legal origins to Section 442 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the sweeping post-9/11 law that established the Department of Homeland Security. That section created something called the Bureau of Border Security to take over the enforcement functions of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service.
Then on January 30, 2003, President George W. Bush submitted a reorganization plan to Congress that renamed the Bureau of Border Security as the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement—the agency we now know as U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or ICE—and reconfigured the responsibilities it would take on.
Congress usually establishes a federal agency in two steps: first, an enabling or authorizing law that formally creates the agency and defines its mission; then, appropriations that fund it. With ICE, the first step was never completed.
Lawmakers created DHS and authorized the broad immigration functions housed within it, but never passed a law formally establishing ICE as a distinct agency with a defined mission. ICE’s basic architecture was instead established by the executive branch. This included the uneasy pairing of criminal investigators under Homeland Security Investigations with civil deportation officers under what is now Enforcement and Removal Operations, despite their distinct missions and authorities.
The Bush administration also folded other responsibilities into ICE, including the Federal Air Marshal Service and the Federal Protective Service. DHS soon concluded those fits were poor ones: the Air Marshals were moved to the Transportation Security Administration, and the Federal Protective Service was later spun out to a different parent structure within the Department.
When lawmakers have tried to address structural questions directly, they haven’t followed through. In 2014, the House held a hearing titled “Authorizing Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement” and took up two bills to authorize CBP and ICE. At the hearing the agencies welcomed the effort, thanking lawmakers for legislation that would formally authorize their missions “for the first time.” But in the end, both efforts failed.
Congress continued to fund ICE, year after year, without directly confronting the agency’s design or purpose. In that time, it has become the most heavily funded law enforcement agency in the federal government. Yet Congress does not subject either DHS or ICE to the same level of oversight it applies to other security and intelligence agencies.
Take the Department of Defense. Every year for more than six decades, Congress has passed a National Defense Authorization Act. The NDAA doesn’t appropriate funding, but it is the vehicle through which Congress continuously shapes the Pentagon: authorizing programs, setting personnel levels, imposing reporting requirements, and restructuring organizations. Whatever its imperfections, it serves as a yearly reminder that the military answers to the legislature.
DHS has never had an equivalent—and ICE, the agency inside it, has had even less. The closest Congress ever came to a comprehensive authorization of the department was in 2017, when the House passed a reauthorization bill by an overwhelming 386–41, only for it to die in the Senate without ever getting a vote.
That was the pattern throughout the department’s early years: The House Homeland Security Committee drafted authorization bills year after year, and the Senate never acted. One explanation is that DHS’s responsibilities were spread across so many congressional committees that no single one could lead an annual authorization bill the way the Armed Services Committees do for the NDAA.
Why Reconciliation Makes Oversight More Difficult
Even though Congress theoretically has many ways to oversee agencies, in practice over the last two decades it has used the budget as its main lever for controlling ICE. Appropriations bills and report language were how lawmakers capped the number of detention beds, required inspections, demanded reports, and put strings on how the money got spent.
I saw how this worked from the inside. I spent years at ICE, across the Obama, the first Trump, and Biden administrations, working to improve detention conditions, expand legal access, and build alternatives to detention. The agency snapped to attention for whoever held its purse strings.
If the Appropriations Committee requested information or a briefing it got a quick response. But a senator or representative who was not on the committee—even one with deep expertise who had legitimate oversight questions—could frequently be brushed off and left waiting a long time for a reply. That is not how congressional engagement is supposed to work, and it is certainly not oversight.
It was imperfect and imprecise, but it was a tool Congress could use to keep the agency in check. Now that, too, is gone. Twice in the past year, Congress has funded ICE not through the annual appropriations process but through budget reconciliation, putting the agency beyond its reach.
In July 2025, the One Big Beautiful Bill Act used budget reconciliation to pour more than $75 billion into ICE—part of nearly $140 billion for DHS immigration enforcement—roughly tripling the agency’s annual budget from about $10 billion to some $30 billion. Of that $75 billion, about $45 billion is specifically for expanding detention. Then on June 10, Congress passed the Secure America Act, which added another $70 billion through 2029, including $38 billion more for ICE.
The reconciliation label matters for two reasons. First, the packages were designed to put ICE’s funding beyond the reach of the annual appropriations process. With the money locked in through 2029, the annual bill no longer functions as a point of leverage: whatever happens in any given year’s funding fight, ICE already has its money.
Speaker Mike Johnson said as much after the Secure America Act passed: “By funding it for three years, we’ve taken away their ability to cut that funding or to take hostage the funding for the remainder of the Trump administration.”
Second, this reconciliation money carried no committee reports, no detailed conditions, none of the guidance that tells an agency how Congress intends funds to be used, and none of the strings that have historically been the vehicle for oversight. The money simply flows, and it flows fast.
With a seemingly bottomless budget, new contracting mechanisms, and no public reporting requirements, ICE now operates largely out of public view. We have little idea what the agency is actually doing with the money Congress provides. As it buys federally owned assets like aircraft and buildings, it builds infrastructure and long-term obligations that a future administration will struggle to unwind. Why not just sell the planes and detention facilities? Because, as years of experience at ICE have shown, it is very hard to unwind any expansion of enforcement once it is built.
This doesn’t mean oversight is legally impossible. No Congress can bind its successors, so a future appropriations law could in theory condition the spending of these funds on new reporting or transparency requirements. But that flips the normal order of things, and the reversal matters.
Normally, funding reaches agencies through annual appropriation bills that arrive preloaded with conditions, report language, and the implicit leverage of next year’s funding. Much of that oversight framework has never actually been law but instead rests in committee report language that agencies typically follow as a matter of practice.
Any effort to reassert control would now require Congress to pass new legislation and override a presidential veto. Oversight has shifted from the path of least resistance to a more difficult political and legislative process.
The fate of one small office shows what this looks like in practice. In late 2019, through the FY2020 appropriations bill, Congress created the Office of the Immigration Detention Ombudsman, an independent body to investigate deaths, medical care, and misconduct in immigration detention. The way it was established was novel: through an appropriations bill that simply wrote the office into the DHS statute.
This May, DHS shuttered it, blaming Congress for not funding it in the latest appropriations package, and nothing in the bill required its closure or prevented DHS from sustaining it. Sit with the asymmetry. The appropriations process can still kill an oversight office—but it can no longer constrain the enforcement agency it was overseeing, because that agency’s money now arrives through reconciliation, years in advance, beyond the reach of any funding bill. The watchdog died as deaths in ICE custody hit an all-time high.
Taken together, this paints a worrying picture. An agency created by executive reorganization rather than statute. Never authorized by Congress. Operating under a legal framework unchanged since 1996. Now funded years into the future through a process that strips out every traditional condition and control, with billions available at a single official’s discretion. Whatever you think of ICE’s mission, this is an agency that is—as a matter of institutional design—functionally accountable to no one but the President.
So why does this matter now? Questions of authorization and oversight can feel abstract, even wonky—the kind of thing that rarely breaks through. Under a more benign administration, these structural weaknesses remained mostly out of view. ICE functioned much as it always had, with familiar, well-documented problems that attracted relatively little national attention.
That is no longer the case.
The relevant question is no longer whether the structure is tidy, but rather what an agency with this much funding, this little oversight, and this kind of mandate is capable of. Oversight mechanisms exist to guard against this kind of breakdown. And it is precisely now, when it matters most, that we have the least of it.
What Should Congress Do Now?
Congress should define ICE’s mission, enforcement priorities, and limits in statute, as it does for the military and the intelligence agencies, and require authorization every two to five years. This would force lawmakers to revisit these questions regularly, rather than once in a generation.
For larger changes, workable proposals already exist. The Hyphen Immigration Blueprints, which I helped write with other former federal officials who served across several administrations, would pull detention out of ICE and into an entirely new Office of the Civil Detention Trustee, redefine how states and local governments participate in the immigration process, reset enforcement priorities, and open legal pathways to meet labor needs.
At a minimum, Congress should put real guardrails on the money it has already handed over like spending conditions, requiring a public plan with operational and community impacts for detention expansion, transparency and reporting requirements for any use of force and internal complaints, inspection results tied to funds, and limits on discretionary slush funds.
Protections matter for the people on the receiving end of enforcement, whose lives are upended by an agency operating without meaningful rules. And they matter just as much for the taxpayer, whose money—well over $100 billion of it—has now been committed to an agency that cannot tell you, with any rigor, what it is buying, from whom, or to what end.



Thank you Claire, for sharing the history of ICE with so many people who weren't there or aware of its creation. There has always been tension within ICE, between ICE and CBP and between ICE and other federal law enforcement agencies. The fact that ICE (and all of the rest of DHS) has both none and too many Congressional oversight committees (no committee has the full authorization authority for all of the department, and all of the committees that had oversight of any legacy agency retained it), means that other than the appropriations subcommittee for DHS which actually does have authority for the entire department, none can command the type of attention and respect from the department that House and Senate Armed Forces Committees do for the Defense Department. To your point, by neutering the appropriations process, it further limits Congressional oversight. Add to that the fact that there has been no nominated and confirmed head of ICE since the Obama administration means even the nominations process is not able to be a check on the leadership of the department. This is a longstanding issue that the 9/11 Commission recognized as problematic. Just further evidence of Congress abdicating its responsibilities to the executive.
Wow thanks for this post